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lously honored' test was met, in the instant case, from the facts that the initial
interrogation took only about twenty
minutes, that there was over a two hour
period in between interrogations, that
Miranda warnings were fully given both
times and great care was taken both
times to ensure that Mosley understood
them, and that the two interrogations
concerned different and separate factual
occurrences. Whereas the Michigan
Court of Appeals viewed Mosley's case
as factually similar to Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (a companion
case to Miranda), the United Staes Supreme Court found marked factual
differences in that Westover involved
prolonged, sequential interrogations with
no significant time lapses and without
any warnings to the arrestee. In essence,
the Court found no overreaching by the
state, that Mosley's statement was voluntarily and informedly given, and that the
principles of Miranda were preserved.
For these reasons, the decision of the
Michigan Court of Appeals was reversed
in favor of the state and the case remanded.
Justice White concurred in the result,
but would have gone further than the
Court and would have overruled
Miranda to the extent that the
" .. .Miranda decision might be read to
require interrogation to cease for some
magical and unspecified period of time
following an assertion of the 'right to silence,' and to reject voluntariness as the
standard by which to judge informed
waivers of that right." 44 L. W. at 4020.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, dissented on the ground that
" ... as to statements which are the
product of renewed questioning,
Miranda established a virtually irrebuttable presumption of compulsion ... and that presumption stands
strongest where, as in this case, a suspect, haVing initially determined to remain silent, is subsequently brought to
confess his crime. Only by adequate
procedural safeguards could the presumption be rebutted." 44 L. W. at
4021. Justice Brennan would find two
altemative adequate safeguards to be a
speedy arraignment or presence of
counsel. He said:
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"I do not mean to imply that counsel
may be forced on a suspect who does
not request an attorney. I suggest only
that either arraignment or counsel must
be provided before resumption of questioning to eliminate the coercive atmosphere of in-custody interrogation. The
Court itself apparently proscribes resuming questioning until counsel is present if
an accused has exercised the right to
have an attorney present at questioning." 44 L.W. at 4021, n.4.
The dissent also feels that the subjectmatter of the two interrogations were related because the informer's tip for the
arrest covered both sets of crimes, the
homicide arose from the factual context
of a robbery, and defendant had told the
initial interrogator that he didn't want to
say "[a]nything about robberies," 44
L. W. at 4022. That is, the dissent believes the right to remain silent was
exercised in a manner to cover the
subject-matter of the second interrogation.
In evaluating the Mosley case, it appears to me that the subject-matter test is
a non sequitur; i.e., that Mosley stands
for the proposition that repeated interrogations are proper if (I) Miranda warnings are given before each interrogation
session, (2) there are Significant time
lapes between sessions, (3) each session
ceases when the defendant exercises his
Fifth Amendment rights, and (4) the factual case-by-case context does not show
relentless badgering of a suspect in such
a manner as to coerce his testimory or
undermine the voluntariness factor essential to an informed and willful statement. As a practical matter, strong limits
remain upon the ability of the state to repeatedly custodially interrogate suspects. These limits include the suspect's
rights to continually exercise his right to
remain silent, his right to obtain the assistance of counsel at any stage of interrogation, and his right to a speedy hearing
before a magistrate. Further, excessive
pressure from the state will still result in
the inadmissibility of inciminating
statements. The net effect of Mosley still
leaves the public interests in police investigative work in balance with the constitutional rights of public defendants.
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In an action brought under 42 U.s.c.
sec. 1983, the Supreme Court, led by
Justice Rehnquist, reversed a federal district court's attempt to end a pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police mistreatment of citizens. Rizzo v. Goode, 44
LW 4095, was decided on January 21;
1976 and is the resting spot for litigation
which lasted six years.
Rizzo began as two separate actions
(Goode v. Rizzo and COPPAR v. Tate),
each commencing in 1970, in which the
principal defendants were the officials
occupying the offices of Mayor, City
Managing Director (who supervises and,
with the Mayor's approval, appoints the
Police Commissioner) and Police
Commissioner (who has direct supervisory power over the police department).
The two suits, permitted to proceed as
class actions, alleged a pervasive pattern
of illegal and unconstitutional police mistreatment, of minority citizens particularly, and of Philadelphia residents generally. The defendants were charged
with conduct ranging from express authorization or encouragement of police
misconduct to failure to act in a manner
which would assure that such misconduct would not occur in the future.
Before the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, forty-odd
incidents of alleged police misconduct
were revealed. Hearings lasted twentyone days and two hundred and fifty witnesses testified, resulting in findings of
fact which both sides accepted with respect to thirty-six incidents. {The inci-

dents are detailed in 357 F. Supp. at
1294-1316). The Supreme Court summarized the District Court's findings as
follows:
The principal antagonists in the eight
incidents recounted in Goode were Officers DeFazio and D'Amico, members
of the city's "Highway Patrol" force.
They were not named as parties to the
action. The District Court found the
conduct of these officers to be violative
of the constitutional rights of the citizen
complainants in three of the incidents,
and further found that complaints to the
police Board of Inquiry had resulted in
one case in a relatively mild five-day
sUspension and in another case a conclusion that there was no basis for disciplinary action.
In only two of the 28 incidents recounted in COPPAR (which ranged in
time from October 1969 to October
1970) did the District Court draw an
explicit conclusion that the police conduct amounted to a deprivation of a federally secured right; it expressly found no
police misconduct whatsoever in four of
the incidents; and in one other the departmental policy complained of was
subsequently changed. As to the remaining 21, the District Court did not proffer a
comment on the degree of misconduct
that had occurred: whether simply improvident; illegal under police regulations or state law; or actually violative of
the individual's constitutional rights.
Rizzo, supra at 4097.
After sifting through all these facts, the
District Court found that although no
policy to violate the legal and constitutional rights of the plaintiff classes was established, there was evidence that departmental procedure tended to discourage the filing of citizen complaints
against the police and to minimize the
consequences of police misconduct. Regarding the plaintiff class of Philadelphia
residents, the District Court further
found that although only a small percentage of police violated legal and constitutional rights of the Philadelphians, the
frequency with which violations occur-

red was such that "they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances." 357
F.Supp., at 1319.
The District Court concluded by ordering (in 1973) the defendants to draft
a "comprehensive program for dealing
adequately with civilian complaints" and
the Court suggested gUidelines such as
"(1) Appropriate revision of police manuals and rules of procedure spelling out
in some detail, in simple language, the
'do's and don'ts' of permissible conduct
in dealing with civilians... (2) Revision
of procedures for processing complaints
against police.... " 357 F.Supp. at
1321.
As a result of this order, plaintiffs and
defendants expanded the police department's two and one half page directive for handling complaints into a fourteen page document which reflected the
revisions suggested by the District Court
gUidelines. This document was incorporated into the District Court's final judgment and the City Police Commissioner
thereafter was req uired to enforce the directives contained in the document.
The defendants appealed the order
and final judgment of the District Court
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, claiming that the federal
judiciary was intruding into the discretionary authority committed to the
defendants as public officials by state
and local law. In 1974, the Third Circuit
upheld the District Court'sfindings that
the police department's existing procedures for handling citizen's complaints of
police misconduct were "inadequate;"
further, it affirmed the District Court's
choice of eqUitable relief, stating "The
revisions were ordered because they
appeared to have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct."
Goode v. Rizzo,
F.2d ,
(CA3,
1974), cited in Rizzo, supra at 4096.
Petitioners appealed the affirmation of
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the
judgment of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decree of
the District Court, analyzed liability

under 42 U.s.c. sec. 1983, the basis of
the class actions. Section 1983 provides
that:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action of law, suit inequity, or
other proper proceedings for redress.
The Supreme Court stated that "The
plain words of the statute impose
liability - whether in the form of payment of redressive damages or being
placed under an injunction - only for
conduct which 'subjects or causes to be
subjected' the complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution." Rizzo, supra at 4098. As far as
such conduct was concern, the Supreme Court saw no causal connection
between the complaints and the individual respondents. Individual police officers who were found to have violated
constitutional rights were not named as
party defendants; only a few of the individuals whose rights were violated were
named as party plaintiffs. Also, "As the
facts developed, there was no affirmative link between the occurrence of the
various incidents of police misconduct
and the adoption of any plan or policy by
petitioners - express or otherwiseshowing their authorization or approval
of such misconduct." Rizzo, supra at
4098
The Court entertained "serious
doubts" that an. Article III "case or controversy" was made out. Rizzo, supra at
4098. In discussing O'Sea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974) and Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme
Court pointed out that in the Rizzo case
the respondents' claim to "real andimmediate" injUry rested only upon what
one of a small anonymous group of
police officers might do in the future because of that officer's perception of de-
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partmental disciplinary procedures. The
Court stated, "insofar as 'the individual
respondents were concerned, we think
they lacked the requisite 'personal stake
in the outcome,' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962), i.e., the order overhauling police disciplinary procedures."
Rizzo, supra at 4098.
The conclusion that no Article III
"case or controversy" existed would
perhaps have ended the matter, noted
the Court, but the District Court's certification of the plaintiff classes bridged the
gap between facts revealed at the tiral
and classwide relief sought under sec.
1983. The Supreme Court, however
disagreed with the District Court's holding that a section 1983 action was made
out based on the showing of an "unacceptably high" number of incidents of
police misconduct, there being shown
twenty incidents in a city of three million
people and seventy five hundred police
officers. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939),Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802

(1974), and Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197 (CA4, 1966) were distinguished from Rizzo. In Hague, there
existed deliberate policies of public officials, implemented by force and violence, to deprive plaintiffs of constitutional rights. In Medrano, "a single plan"
and "a pervasive pattern of intimidation" by public officials which resulted in
suppression of constitutional rights were
revealed. Medrano, supra at 812. In
Lankford, a plan conceived by public officials was implemented which resulted
in the flagrant deprivation of constitutional rights of citizens. The Supreme
Court decided that the facts in Rizzo
showed no plan or pattern by public officials to deprive plaintiff class members of
their constitutional rights; further, the
Court found untenable the District
Court's conclusion "that even without a
showing of direct responsibility for the
actions of a small percentage of the
police force, petitioners' failure to act in
the face of a statistical pattern" was en-

joinable under sec. 1983. Rizzo, supra at
4099. The Court concluded that "Under
the well-established rule that federal
'judicial powers may be exercised only
on the basis of a constitutional Violation,'
Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16(1971), this
case presented no occasion for the District Court to grant equitable relief
against the petitioners." Rizzo, supra at
4100.
Principles of federalism were also discussed by the Court as it rendered its decision. The Supreme Court, noting that
the District Court's order and judgment
sharply limited the police department's
handling of its internal affairs, decided
that the District Court departed from the
duty of the federal courts to be "constantly mindful of the 'special delicacy
of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and state
administration of its own law.' " Stenfanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117,120
(1951), quited in O'Shea v. Littleton,
supra at 500.
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